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MONETARY REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS
DURING ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CASES
Jeffrey A. Parness, Laura Lee, and Karen Blouin*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, Illinois voters overwhelmingly added a constitutional bill of
rights for crime victims,1 joining several other American states with
express constitutional protections.2 Most American state constitutional
provisions have only been enacted recently, reflecting state public
policies increasing respect for crime victims during criminal cases.
The tenth (and last) enumerated right in the Illinois Crime Victim’s
Rights Amendment is the “right to restitution.”3 Restitution is but one
form of monetary remedy available to crime victims.4 Other remedies
include monies beyond restitution paid by criminal offenders and
monies paid to crime victims by governments.
Express constitutional rights, such as this right to restitution, need
not be accompanied by corresponding legislation.
Implementing
legislation is unnecessary where the constitutional right is self-executing.
The Illinois crime victim provisions do not contain, however, rights
enforceable without General Assembly action. Rather, crime victim
rights are to be provided by law.5 Nevertheless, they are specially
addressed in the constitution, denoting enhanced importance. The ten
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1
Editorial, The Rights of Victims—And Others, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1992 at
2B [hereinafter Rights of Victims].
2
National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Passage, http://www.nvcap.org (last
visited Mar. 8, 2009) (click state vras link in the index on the left side of the website).
3
ILL. CONST. art I, § 8.1(a)(10).
4
See, e.g., Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97
HARV. L. REV. 931, 932–33 (1984) (reviewing varying forms of criminal case restitution
orders, recognizing civil trial processes for crime victim recoveries, and opining that “civil
process safeguards are undesirable as well as unnecessary” for criminal case restitution
orders).
5
ILL. CONST. art I, § 8.1(a) (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following
rights . . .”); id. § 8.1(b) (“The General Assembly may provide by law for the enforcement of
this Section.”). See also id. § 8.1(c) (“The General Assembly may provide for an assessment
against convicted defendants to pay for crime victims’ rights.”).
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crime victims’ rights, including restitution, should be glorified, not
trivialized, by legislators.
While crime victim restitution is addressed legislatively, many
Illinois crime victims receive few or no monetary remedies. This Article
examines the deficiencies in current Illinois laws on monetary remedies
for crime victims during criminal cases. These failures undermine the
desires of the electorate in 1992. This Article suggests reforms after
examining experiences in other American states. In particular, it urges
that monetary remedies for Illinois crime victims should be addressed in
a single statutory scheme. The current statutes, including provisions on
restitution, a state-supported compensation fund, and remedies at
sentencing, are poorly coordinated and incomplete in their
implementation of the constitutional right to restitution.
II. THE GROWTH OF CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS
Early in United States history there was a very different criminal
justice system. Based on the English system, early criminal justice
typically involved struggles between individual citizens, with emphases
on the restoration of the victims by the offenders.6 Thus, criminal justice
was largely driven by crime victims acting as police, prosecutors, and
punishers.7 As there was no public prosecution, private criminal
prosecution was usually available only to those with resources.8 In early
English common law, justice was achieved, if at all, through corporal
punishment of the offender by the victim or through restitution to the
victim from the offender.9 Early in United States history similar private

Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social
Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 255 (2005).
[R]estorative justice recognizes crime as being directed against
individual people. It is grounded in the belief that those most affected
by crime should have the opportunity to become actively involved in
resolving the conflict . . . . In the years preceding [Henry I’s] decree
[securing jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses], crime had been
viewed as conflict between individuals, and an emphasis upon
repairing the damage by making amends to the victim was well
established.
Id.
7
Jennie L. Caissie, Passing the Victims’ Rights Amendment: A Nation’s March Toward a
More Perfect Union, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 647, 651 (1998).
8
Id. at 650–52. Resources were expended for aiding assistance in arrest, investigation,
and prosecution as well as for providing rewards for information on criminals. JAMES
STARK & HOWARD W. GREEN, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS 20 (1985).
9
Caissie, supra note 7, at 649.
6
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prosecutions occurred, with some victims hiring lawyers after initiating
criminal charges.10
Although the transition period is not entirely understood, a system
of public prosecution developed11 in the late 1800s.12 As crime
increasingly was viewed as an offense against the “community as a
whole,”13 the victim was relegated to “alienated third party” status.14
The diminished role of the crime victim coincided with the increased
recognition of the rights of the criminally accused.15
The focus on the rights of the accused was perhaps most extensive in
the 1960s.16 As the rights of alleged criminal offenders grew through
federal constitutional precedents interpreting various explicit federal
constitutional provisions,17 crime victims increasingly pressed their
interests through grassroots organizations.18 Greater public recognition
of crime victim rights slowly developed, starting in the 1960s.19 There
was increasing study of victimology, including explorations into
criminal/crime victim relationships.20 Some researchers found that

Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal
Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2007) (“Even after identification and arrest, the
victim carried the burden of prosecution. He retained an attorney and paid to have the
indictment written and the offender prosecuted.”) (quoting William F. McDonald, Towards
a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
649, 652 (1976)).
11
Caissie, supra note 7, at 652.
12
Beloof, supra note 10, at 1146.
13
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 1009 (1985).
14
Caissie, supra note 7, at 655.
15
Id. (discussing the need to protect against vindictiveness). See also id. at 652
(discussing the need to insulate those criminally charged from “irrational private
prosecutions”).
16
Henderson, supra note 13, at 943.
From the post-World War II period to the mid-1960s, liberal theories
were ascendant, with respect to both the social welfare approach to
crime prevention and offenders and the classic liberal ideology of
protecting the individual from the overreaching power of the state.
Liberals emphasized the social origins of crime—poverty, alienation,
lack of education, discrimination—and sought to remedy these
perceived causes of crime. They advocated rehabilitation, rather than
punishment, of convicted criminals. And they sought to protect the
constitutional rights of the accused, finding a responsive majority in
the United States Supreme Court.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
17
Caissie, supra note 7, at 655.
18
Henderson, supra note 13, at 949–50.
19
MARLENE YOUNG & JOHN STEIN, THE HISTORY OF CRIME VICTIMS’ MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005/pdf/
historyofcrime.pdf.
20
Id.
10
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victims often chose not to report crimes because of their “disillusionment
with the system.”21
As crime rates soared, a get-tough attitude on crime also gained
momentum.22 There was some backlash to the judicial focus on the
rights of the accused.23 The plight of crime victims became important to
those supporting prosecutors in the criminal justice system.24
In this setting, a movement to better compensate crime victims arose.
In particular, increased opportunities for compensation were thought to
facilitate greater cooperation by otherwise reticent witnesses. Most
compensation programs were need-based.25 Over time, however, crime
victim compensation schemes were increasingly based on “a justice
orientation.”26
Crime victims’ rights also gained support from the emerging
women’s movement.27 Proponents sought to change the way female
crime victims were treated, especially in sexual assault and domestic
abuse cases.28 In fact, two of the earliest crime victim assistance

Id.
Henderson, supra note 13, at 945–46.
The decline of support for liberal approaches and the inability of
liberals to solve the apparent paradoxes created by their beliefs left the
crime issue to the conservatives. Conservatives pointed to the failures
of liberal programs and emphasized that crime was a matter of
individual choice and wickedness. They adhered to the “crime
control” model of criminal justice that emphasizes “efficiency” in the
criminal process . . . . Central to the ideology of the crime control
model are “the presumption of guilt” and the belief “that the criminal
process is a positive guarantor of social freedom.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23
Conservatives believed that bad actors were getting off on “legal technicalities”
because of the exclusionary rule and Miranda rights. Id. at 948.
24
Id. at 948–49.
25
Award of compensation was dependent upon victims’ cooperation with police and
prosecutors. YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 2.
26
Id.
27
Henderson, supra note 13, at 949.
[B]y the middle of the 1970s different groups began to focus their
attention on the victims of particular crimes. For example, the
women’s movement did much to emphasize the plight of rape victims
in the legal process, while the more recently formed group, “Mothers
Against Drunk Driving” . . . brought the victims of drunk drivers to
public attention. The success of these groups concerned with
particular crimes and crime victims served to highlight the general
importance of “victims” as an effective political symbol.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
28
YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 2.
21
22
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programs were “rape crisis centers.”29 These programs demonstrated
that victims were often mistreated by criminal justice professionals.30
Crime victim activism was further boosted by organizations
established by survivors of homicide victims, including Mothers Against
Drunk Driving and Parents of Murdered Children.31 In 1975, the
National Organization for Victim Assistance began to coordinate efforts
on behalf of crime victims.32 In 1981, crime victims were aided when
President Ronald Reagan instituted a National Victims’ Rights Week.33
Crime victim activism shifted to the states toward the latter part of
the twentieth century. California enacted laws providing compensation
for crime victims in 1965 and then “became the first state to establish
state funding for victim assistance in 1980.”34 In 1980, Wisconsin became
the first state to approve a statutory crime victims’ Bill of Rights.35
Efforts continued elsewhere to become more responsive to crime
victims.36 By 1990, several American states had some form of a Bill of
Rights provision for crime victims.37 A more recent tally found there
were more than 32,000 statutes nationwide addressing crime victim
rights.38 It was in this setting that certain crime victim rights were
constitutionalized in Illinois in 1992.
III. THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CRIME VICTIM RESTITUTION
In Illinois, a proposed constitutional Crime Victim’s Rights
amendment was placed on the ballot in November 1992, after approval
by the House on a 117-0 vote and after overwhelming approval by the
Senate.39 The change was suggested by then-Illinois Attorney General

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
31
Henderson, supra note 13, at 949–50.
32
YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 5.
33
Id. at 6.
34
Id. at 2, 5.
35
Id. at 5. See also WISC. CONST. art. I, § 9m (noting that effective in 1993, the State shall
“ensure” varying “privileges and protections” for crime victims).
36
See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Constitutional or Statutory Victims’ Bill of Rights, 91 A.L.R.5TH 343, 362–63 (2001).
37
YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 8.
38
Id.
39
Tim Novak, Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights is Supported by House 117-0, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, April 23, 1992 at 6A. The Senate vote was forty-nine yes, one no, and four
voting present. State of Illinois, 87th General Assembly Regular Session, Senate Transcript,
Apr. 30, 1992, at 18.
29
30
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Roland Burris.40 When the amendment passed, over a dozen other
American states had already spoken constitutionally on crime victims.41
The Illinois initiative was intended to elevate crime victims in order to
partially level the playing field with criminal defendants and to give
crime victims a more significant role in the criminal justice system.
Opponents protested that the amendment was a waste of time, as there
could always be statutory protections.42 The Illinois amendment passed
with over three-fourths voter approval.43 Its provisions, now in Section
8.1 of Article I, say in part:
SECTION 8.1. CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHTS.
(a) Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the
following rights as provided by law:
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and respect
for their dignity and privacy throughout the
criminal justice process.
(2) The right to notification of court proceedings.
(3) The right to communicate with the prosecution.
(4) The right to make a statement to the court at
sentencing.
(5) The right to information about the conviction,
sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused.
(6) The right to timely disposition of the case
following the arrest of the accused.
(7) The right to be reasonably protected from the
accused throughout the criminal justice process.
(8) The right to be present at the trial and all other
court proceedings on the same basis as the accused,
unless the victim is to testify and the court
determines that the victim’s testimony would be
materially affected if the victim hears other
testimony at the trial.
(9) The right to have present at all court
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an

Victims’-Rights Measure on Illinois Referendum, http://www.illinimedia.com/di/
archives/1992/November/2/victimsright.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) [hereinafter
Illinimedia].
41
Rights of Victims, supra note 1.
42
Illinimedia, supra note 40.
43
The vote was 2,964,592 for and 715,602 against. Illinois Constitution — Amendment
Proposed, http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/conampro.htm (last visited June 8,
2009).
40
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advocate or other support person of the victim’s
choice.
(10) The right to restitution.44
Besides defining crime victims45 as well as the ten enumerated rights,
the General Assembly is also expressly authorized to “provide by law for
the enforcement” of the rights46 and to provide for their funding,
including the imposition of assessments against criminal defendants.47
So, the Illinois constitutional right to restitution is quite dependent upon
state legislators. But legislative discretion is not boundless given the
strong support in the constitutional convention and with the voters.48
Illinois General Assembly responsibility for explicit constitutional
rights is not limited to crime victims. Elsewhere, legislation plays a
variety of roles in the development of constitutional law. Constitutional
claims that can be pursued directly in court cases without legislative
authorization involve self-executing rights. Article I, Section 17 of the
Illinois Constitution has a self-execution clause, declaring that certain
antidiscrimination rights “are enforceable without action by the General
Assembly,” though legislation may establish reasonable exemptions and
provide additional remedies.49 Enforcement by lawsuits, absent any
enabling legislation, is thus contemplated.
When a constitutional right is accompanied by a self-execution
clause, Illinois courts have entertained claims in the absence of enabling
legislation. In Baker v. Miller,50 a claimant alleged sex discrimination in
employment,51 relying on Section 17 of Article I which states:
All persons shall have the right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national
ILL. CONST. art I, § 8.1(a).
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“crime victims, as defined by law”); CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 8 (“a victim, as the general assembly may define by law”). Cf. ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§§ 2.1(C), 2.1(A)(8) (defining “victim” who has a right to receive “prompt restitution”).
46
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(b). See also CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (restitution enforceable as
“provided by law”). Cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13)(B) (“Restitution shall be
ordered . . . in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a loss.”).
47
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(c).
48
Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13), OR. CONST. art. I, § 42, and R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 23 (constitutions silent on role of legislature in crime victim restitution), with S.C. CONST.
art. I, §§ 24(A), 24(A)(9) (“[V]ictims of crime have the right to . . . receive prompt and full
restitution.”), and id. at § 24(C)(3) (“The General Assembly has the authority to enact
substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve, and protect [the right to
restitution], including the authority to extend [the right] to juvenile proceedings.”).
49
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
50
636 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. 1994).
51
Id. at 552–53.
44
45
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ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices
of any employer or in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the
General Assembly, but the General Assembly by law
may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these
rights and provide additional remedies for their
violation.52
The court held that because of the self-execution clause, legislation was
unnecessary for the claim to proceed.53 But the court also found that any
monetary remedies were limited by the General Assembly’s “reasonable
exemptions” found within the Illinois Human Rights Act.54 In Baker, the
claimant was without a damage remedy for unconstitutional
discrimination because her employer was exempted under the Act.55
Illinois constitutional rights involving discrimination, within Section
18 of Article I, were reviewed in Teverbaugh v. Moore.56 There, a seventhgrade student and her mother sued a school district for sex
discrimination by two male students. Section 18 declares there shall be
no sex discrimination by “units of local government and school
districts.” Section 18 mentions neither self-execution nor General
Assembly action. The appellate court held that any recovery must come
under the Human Rights Act.57 It further found the Act contained no
claim for discrimination occurring in primary or secondary schools.58
The court compared Section 18 to Section 17, focusing on the words
used59 as they provide the best indication of drafter intent.60 Additional
bases for interpretation can appear, of course, in legislative or
constitutional convention debates, as well as in conduct surrounding the
“first legislative action” following the adoption of a constitutional
provision.61 While Section 17 states that “[a]ll persons shall have the
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 553.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 554 (employer had fewer than fifteen employees).
56
724 N.E.2d 225 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
57
Id. at 230 (“[I]t is incumbent upon the Illinois legislature to acknowledge a right of
action under the Human Rights Act.”).
58
Id. (“[W]e are aware that the Human Rights Act does not expressly recognize a right
of action for damages under the circumstances contemplated in this case.”).
59
Id. at 229.
60
Id. (“The comparative texts of . . . section 17 . . . and section 18, evidence that where
the drafters intended to provide a right of action for damages for discrimination, they
purposely included language to effect such a result in the absence of implementing
legislation.”).
61
See Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. No. 142 v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ill. 1973) (analyzing
the legislative action of Article VIII in the Illinois Constitution).
52
53
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right to be free from discrimination” and that “[t]hese rights are
enforceable without action by the General Assembly,”62 Section 18 only
says “equal protection . . . shall not be denied.”63 In comparing Sections
17 and 18 and examining Baker, the Teverbaugh court found that the
Section 18 drafters did not intend an automatic private right of action,64
concluding that where drafters use different language, they usually
intend different results.65
Constitutional rights were also at play in AIDA v. Time Warner where
a claimant sought declaratory relief because the defendant’s television
show, The Sopranos, “breache[d]” the individual dignity clause.66 That
clause says in full, in Article I, Section 20: “To promote individual
dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of
virtue in, or that incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a
person or group of persons by reason of or by reference to religious,
racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation are condemned.”67 The
AIDA court found Section 20 was completely “hortatory.”68 It relied on
the earlier Irving v. Marsh case where the court looked to the legislative
history, specifically a Bill of Rights Committee Report, which stated:
“[Again [Victor Arrigo, the provisions supervisor] want
to reiterate, the individual dignity clause in no way
qualifies or modifies the constitutional rights of free
speech and press.]” The provision creates no private right
or cause of action . . . .
It is purely hortatory, “a
constitutional sermon.”
Like a preamble, such a
provision is not an operative part of the Constitution. It
is included to serve a teaching purpose, to state an ideal
or principle to guide the conduct of government and
individual citizens.69
So a constitutional condemnation of certain conduct can be “merely an
expression of philosophy and not a mandate that a certain remedy be
provided in any specific form.”70

ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Id. § 18. “The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account
of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts.” Id.
64
Teverbaugh, 724 N.E.2d at 229.
65
Id.
66
772 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
67
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20.
68
AIDA, 772 N.E.2d at 961.
69
Id. (citing Irving v. Marsh, 360 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)).
70
Id.
62
63
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However, deference to the General Assembly on enumerated
constitutional rights does not always follow the Teverbaugh approach.
The right to remedy for all wrongs and the rights regarding eminent
domain, within Article I, Sections 12 and 15, use the “as provided by
law” language twice, while the same phrase appears four times in
Section 8.1. Crime victim rights seemingly require a more foundational
role for the General Assembly. The persons entitled to the rights in
Sections 12 and 15 are “every person” and, impliedly, owners of
property taken by eminent domain. Section 8.1, by contrast, references
“crime victims, as defined by law.” As well, Sections 12 and 15
enunciate some very particular protected rights, and then allow these
protections “as provided by law.” This suggests the chief legislative
responsibility is enforcement of the provisions. Section 8.1 on crime
victims differs, as it says “the following rights as provided by law,”
indicating that the rights themselves as well as their enforcement can be
defined legislatively.
Notwithstanding significant General Assembly authority, the Illinois
constitutional crime victim restitution right could be judicially deemed
to provide by itself opportunities for crime victim recoveries. In Rhode
Island there is the constitutional declaration that a “victim of crime shall,
as a matter of right . . . be entitled to receive from the perpetrator of the
crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the
perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as
the state may provide.” In 1998, in Bandoni v. State,71 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court heard a case where a crime victim sued the criminal for
negligence, urging rights afforded both by legislation and the
constitution.72 The court held that although the constitution had
mandatory terms, the crime victim compensation right was not selfexecuting. As there was no language requiring the General Assembly to
act, the court held that the lack of a statutory enforcement scheme meant
the crime victim had no claim. The dissent in Bandoni concluded,
however, that as a general proposition, specific constitutional rights
should be “presumed to be judicially enforceable absent an express
textual negation of such a presumption or a demonstrable textual
commitment of this remedial function to another coordinate branch of
government.”73 The dissent reasoned that if there was no judicial
enforcement absent enabling legislation, criminals could harm victims
with fewer repercussions.74 The dissent concluded that the majority
71
72
73
74
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Id. at 602 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
Id. at 603.
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effectively allowed a legislative veto of a strong constitutional right,75
opining that where drafters intend no lawsuits they directly say so.76
Illinois case precedent suggests that Illinois courts would not follow
the Bandoni dissent on Section 8.1 restitution claims. The Illinois crime
victim restitution right is not self-executing, as victims are “defined by
law” and the enumerated rights are “as provided by law.” Under
Teverbaugh, the absence of self-executing language would mean no intent
to recognize a claim independent of General Assembly action. The long
history of statutory mechanisms for crime victim recoveries in Illinois,
even if not comprehensive, further suggests that any new or expanded
crime victim remedies require legislative action. Yet given that crime
victim restitution is now a constitutional right, expressly enumerated,
restitution should not be subject to absolute legislative whims. There
should be minimally adequate remedies available. Restitution is not
hortatory. Unlike the constitutional provision in AIDA, crime victim
restitution is an enumerated right. It is not simply a ban on certain
conduct. It is more than a “constitutional sermon” or a “teaching” tool.77
So, what do the Illinois statutes now say about monetary remedies
for crime victims, including the constitutional restitution right? Do they
sufficiently implement the intentions of the drafters and of the electorate
to have at least some crime victim monetary remedies? How do the
Illinois statutes compare to statutory crime victim remedies elsewhere in
America? And, are there models that Illinois legislators could employ to
secure better restitution, and perhaps other monetary remedies, for crime
victims in line with the strong intentions to aid crime victims under
Section 8.1?
IV. ILLINOIS STATUTES ON RESTITUTION, COMPENSATION, AND OTHER
MONETARY REMEDIES FOR CRIME VICTIMS
Within the Illinois constitution, the only express crime victim
monetary remedy is restitution. As noted, such restitution significantly
depends on General Assembly action, but it was never intended to be the
sole monetary remedy available to crime victims.78 Before and since
1992, the Illinois General Assembly has had, and has exercised, the
authority over monetary remedies beyond crime victim restitution.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 616.
77
Contra AIDA v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
78
In fact many of the Section 8.1 constitutional rights had predecessors in statutes.
Illinimedia, supra note 40. Yet, restitution had not been addressed by statute before Section
8.1 was adopted. ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1404 (1991) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
120/4 (2008)).
75
76
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Today there are three distinct statutory schemes on monetary recoveries
for crime victims.79
A. Restitution
In Illinois, the crime victim restitution right expressly recognized in
the Illinois constitution invites significant General Assembly action. This
right, together with the other new constitutional Crime Victim’s Rights
of 1992, are now addressed in the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses
Act (“Victims and Witnesses Act”).80 The 1984 predecessor to this Act,
known as The Bill of Rights for Victims and Witnesses of Violent Crimes
Act, did not include a right to restitution. The stated purpose of the 1984
law was “to ensure the fair and compassionate treatment of victims and
witnesses of violent crime . . . who are essential to prosecution.”81 The
1984 version was later amended to address notice to victims upon
request of any plea agreements, appeals, and post-conviction reviews
sought by offenders.82 In 1989, the State’s Attorney was newly
mandated, upon the request of victims, to forward victim impact
statements to the Prisoner Review Board.83
Following adoption of Section 8.1, the carryover 1984 provisions
were placed in the Victims and Witnesses Act.84 The purpose statement
of the new legislation, enacted in 1994, included the goal “to implement,
preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to crime victims by Article I,
Section 8.1.”85 The ten rights listed in Section 8.1, including restitution,
were expressly addressed in the new scheme.86 A new statutory section
was added to include the procedures (formerly there were only the
rights themselves) for implementation. In particular, Section 4.5(b) of the
Act says: “The office of the State’s Attorney . . . shall request restitution

79
See generally Katlin McKelvie et al., Sentencing Guidelines, 88 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1553–59
(2000) (analyzing a brief history of statutory crime victim restitution in the federal district
courts and reviewing the Victims and Witnesses Protection Act of 1982, the Crime Control
Act of 1990, and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996).
80
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1 (2008) (an earlier crime victim’s rights statute, effective
1984, was amended, effective 1994, to reflect new Illinois constitutional provisions on crime
victims).
81
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1402 (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (2008)).
82
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1404(6), (8)–(9) (1987) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
120/4 (2008)).
83
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1404(23) (1989) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4
(2008)).
84
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1 (1994).
85
Id. at 120/2.
86
Id. at 120/4.
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at sentencing and shall consider restitution in any plea negotiation, as
provided by law.”87
Sections 4.5 and 6 of the Act also address other rights within Section
8.1, with the exception of the “right to timely disposition of the case.”
Section 4.5 specifically includes provisions on notice to victims of court
proceedings,88 the availability of “social services and financial
assistance,”89 and the rights to have a “translator present,”90
“appropriate employer intercession services,”91 and assistance in the
prompt return of stolen property.92 These had all been included in the
rights section of the 1984 statute, as had the right to present a victim
impact statement at sentencing.93 The 1994 Act added the right to have
an advocate or support person present at all court proceedings (the ninth
right in Section 8.1).94 It also made the victim’s constitutional right to
communicate with the prosecution more meaningful by requiring that,
upon victim request, the State’s Attorney shall “where practical, consult
with the crime victim” prior to offering a plea or negotiating a plea
agreement.95 As well, with the adoption of Section 8.1, there were new
provisions on such matters as the use of a “[p]rivately operated crime
victim and witness notification service,”96 a “[s]tatewide victim and
witness notification system” established by the Attorney General,97 and
the creation of a toll-free number for victims to provide input for parole
hearings.98 The 1994 statute also added new processes for courts to
consider victim impact statements on possible aggravation or mitigation
relevant to plea proceedings.99 Other than adding the restitution right
itself and mandating that the State’s Attorney request it, the 1994 statute
said nothing else about restitution.100

Id. at 120/4.5(b)(11).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(c) (2008) (“[a]t the written request of the crime victim”).
89
Id. at 120/4.5(b)(3).
90
Id. at 120/4.5(b)(7).
91
Id. at 120/4.5(b)(5).
92
Id. at 120/4.5(b)(4).
93
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶¶ 1404 (6), (10)–(14), (16) (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 120/4 (2008)); ILL. STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 1406 (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
120/6 (2008)).
94
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(9) (1994).
95
Id. at 120/4.5(c)(4) (1994).
96
Id. at 120/8 (1999).
97
Id. at 120/8.5(a) (2000).
98
Id. at 120/4.5(f) (2003).
99
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/6(b) (1994).
100
The Act now says that it does “not limit any rights . . . otherwise enjoyed
by . . . victims . . . of violent crime, nor does it grant any person a cause of action for
damages or attorneys fees.” 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (2008).
87
88
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While the new statutory language could have prompted more crime
victim restitution, it did not. According to the website of the DuPage
County State’s Attorney’s victims services unit, restitution is not
guaranteed but is simply statutorily allowed.101 The DuPage County
State’s Attorney victims services unit says to a victim that “[i]f a
defendant is found not guilty, you may have to pursue restitution
through civil litigation.”102 In addition, it says that if a defendant is
ordered to pay restitution but refuses, or is unable to comply, the States
Attorney’s Office will “attempt enforcement procedures against the
defendant.”103 The website further notes that if a court orders restitution,
it will be payable through the State’s Attorney’s Office or through the
Department of Probation.104
According to the website, restitution contemplates financial
reimbursement to crime victims who have suffered out-of-pocket
expenses resulting from a crime.105 Qualified out-of-pocket expenses
include costs, losses, damages, and injuries. The injuries can be to a
victim’s person or to a victim’s real or personal property. However,
restitution does not encompass punitive damages nor does the DuPage
County notice encompass all who are harmed by criminal acts, as it does
not cover, for example, third parties.
Overall, the Victims and Witnesses Act provides for pre- and postconviction involvement of the crime victim through notice and
communication opportunities. The only monetary remedy in the Act, as
well as in the constitution, is restitution. Section 8.1 seemingly prompted
the General Assembly to add this remedy to its written laws and to
mandate that the State’s Attorney request it. Unfortunately, difficulties
persist in securing more complete crime victim recovery. Problems also
arise when monetary remedies beyond restitution are sought or when
remedies are sought by third parties.
B. Compensation
In addition to restitution, since 1973 the Illinois General Assembly
has provided to victims of violent crimes opportunities for compensation
under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (“Compensation Act”).106
Under the Act, crime victims who have inadequate insurance and no
101 States Attorney Restitution:
DuPage County, Illinois, http://www.dupageco.org/
statesattorney/generic.cfm?doc_id=216 (last visited June 8, 2009) [hereinafter DuPage].
102
Id.
103
Id. (emphasis added).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 et seq. (2008).
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other funding source to cover their expenses are eligible for
compensation for medical bills, counseling, lost wages, “loss of tuition,”
and “funeral, burial and travel” expenses up to $5000, as well as for “loss
of support of the dependents of the victim,” and for other expenses.107
Illinois can provide up to $27,000 to a qualified victim.108 Compensation
under the Act differs from restitution as it is only “a secondary
source.”109 Awards or benefits from other sources, such as Worker’s
Compensation, related causes of action, and insurance, will reduce the
monies available under the Compensation Act.110
In order to qualify for compensation, the victim must have suffered
injury or death as the result of a “crime of violence.”111 The victim must
also have reported the crime within seventy-two hours of its
occurrence112 and submitted a completed application within two years.113
Additionally, the victim must have “cooperated with law enforcement
officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.”114 Clean
hands are required so that the victim cannot be an accomplice.115 The
injury must not have been “substantially attributable” to the victim’s
“wrongful act”116 or “substantially provoked by the victim.”117
Compensation under this Act differs from restitution where there
usually can be a more complete remedy, and crime victim remedies
under the Compensation Act come from the state instead of the offender.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims118 is used to resolve claims, with
funds derived from fines imposed on convicted offenders.119 The
Attorney General is to “promulgate rules . . . investigate all
claims . . . and represent the interests of the State of Illinois.”120 Despite
the required notice of the right to compensation that must be given to
Id. at 45/2(h). The compensation is reduced by the amount of health insurance
benefits available or life insurance proceeds (with $25,000 exempted). Id. at 45/10.1(e). No
showing of economic hardship is required. Id. at 45/10.1.
108
Id. at 45/10.1(f).
109
Id. at 45/10.1(g).
110
Id. at 45/10.1(e) (referring to Section 45/7.1(a)(7)).
111
Id. at 45/2(d) (recognizing that an attempted crime of violence also counts and that
victims include people who “personally witnessed a violent crime”).
112
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6.1(b) (2008).
113
Id. at 45/6.1(a).
114
Id. at 45/6.1(c). But neither conviction nor apprehension is required. Id. at 45/9.1.
115
Id. at 45/6.1(d).
116
Id. at 45/6.1(e).
117
Id.
118
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3.1 (2008).
119
Under the constitutional provision on crime victim’s rights, the “General Assembly
may provide for an assessment against convicted defendants to pay for crime victims’
rights.” ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(c).
120
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4.1 (2008) (note the victim is not separately represented).
107
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victims by hospitals and law enforcement agencies,121 the onus is on the
victim to follow the statutory procedures in order to recover.122 Where
the victim acts, however, there should be little delay in payment and no
concern about enforcement. While there have been some minor changes
made since 1973, including increases in the compensation available, the
Compensation Act has not been significantly altered since the adoption
of Section 8.1.
C. Monetary Remedies at Sentencing
In addition to the Victims and Witnesses Act and the Compensation
Act, the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections (“Corrections Code”)123 has
permitted monetary remedies for crime victims at sentencing since
1977.124 The current Code states the criminal court “in all convictions for
offenses in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 . . . shall order
restitution” where the victim sustained personal injury or property
damage “as a result of the criminal act of the defendant.”125 In other
cases, the court at sentencing must “determine whether restitution is an
appropriate sentence.”126
In its original version, the law simply noted certain procedures “[i]f
restitution is part of the disposition.”127 It also declared the defendant’s
ability to pay restitution as a factor in determining amount.128 Prior to
the adoption of Section 8.1 in 1992, the Corrections Code was amended
several times to increase the use of restitution at sentencing. In 1985, the
Code was changed to require that the court decide at sentencing whether
restitution is appropriate,129 with the defendant’s ability to pay a factor in
determining the method of payment,130 but not the amount.131 By 1988,
the Code stated that the court “shall order restitution” for all convictions
under the Criminal Code of 1961 involving victims sixty-five years or
older. For other cases the court would decide on the appropriateness of
Id. at 45/5.1.
See id. at 45/6.1 (reporting and cooperation duties); id. at 45/7.1 (claim applications).
123
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 (2008).
124
The Code views victims as does the Victims and Witnesses Act, so that a parent of a
mentally disabled victim is also a victim who can recover lost wages for attending the
criminal trial. People v. Fouts, 745 N.E.2d 1284, 1286–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
125
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 (2008).
126
Id.
127
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1977) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6
(2009)).
128
Id. at ¶ 1005-5-6(a).
129
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1985) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6
(2009)).
130
Id. at ¶ 1005-5-6(f).
131
Id. at ¶ 1005-5-6(b).
121
122
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restitution.132 Immediately following the adoption of Section 8.1, there
were no significant amendments.133 But in 1996, the requirement that the
victim be at least sixty-five for mandatory restitution was removed.134
The requirement that the court determine the appropriateness of
restitution in other cases was deleted in 1996,135 but returned in 2000.136
Enforcement mechanisms for restitution orders under the
Corrections Code were initially meager. Excess cash bond could be
applied to restitution, but this was not mandatory.137 The court was
authorized to modify or enlarge any conditions of payment or to revoke
the sentence.138 In 1987, language was added allowing a court to order
the sheriff to seize and sell the offender’s property to satisfy
restitution.139 In 1991, the court was expressly authorized to enter
withholding orders. As well, in 1991 a restitution order was then
explicitly made a judgment lien in favor of the victim, enforceable as any
other lien.140 Since 1992 the Code has declared that restitution is not
discharged upon completion of the sentence.141 Finally, modest changes
were made in 1998 to the civil procedure laws on interest, making them
applicable to restitution orders.142
The current Corrections Code requires that if restitution is ordered,
the loss to the victim must be compensated if “proximately caused by the
conduct of the defendant.”143 Restitution can neither include pain and
suffering144 nor exceed actual costs.145 Besides considering restitution,
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1988) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6
(2009)).
133
Compare ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1992), with ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6 (1994)
(current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 (2009)).
134
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1997) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6
(2009)).
135
Id.
136
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (2000) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6
(2009)).
137
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6(c) (1977) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-56(c) (2009)).
138
Id. ¶ 1005-5-6(d).
139
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6(b) (1987) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-56(b) (2009)).
140
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶¶ 1005-5-6(m) (1992) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-56(m) (2009)) (general lien enforcement procedures are found in the Code of Civil
Procedure).
141
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1992) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6
(2009)).
142
ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(n) (1998) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6
(2009)).
143
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6(a) (2008).
144
Id. at 5/5-5-6(b).
145
Id. at 5/5-5-6(c)(1).
132
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the Code states “the court shall determine whether the property may be
restored in kind . . . or whether the defendant is possessed of sufficient
skill to repair” it.146 It continues: “the court shall allow credit” for such
property in determining the remaining amount of restitution payable in
cash.147 Restitution can also now be established in plea agreements, or
even when criminal charges are dismissed.148 As an order of restitution
is a judgment lien,149 “the court may enter an order directing the sheriff
to seize” and sell a defendant’s property.150 If the offender fails to make
restitution, but there is no willful violation, the court may grant an extra
two years (above an original five)151 for a defendant to pay.152 If failure
to pay is willful, the court may revoke the restitution order153 utilizing
the procedures employed when revoking probation.154
The Code has been construed liberally at times. Thus, while the
Code states that in “taking into consideration the ability of the defendant
to pay . . . the court shall determine whether restitution shall be paid in a
single payment or in installments,”155 one Illinois appellate court has
held that the consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay is not
required in setting the amount of restitution.156 The same court also
noted the legislative intent “to make victims whole for any injury
received . . . and to make criminals pay all of the costs which arise as a
result of the injuries victims suffered.”157
There was also a broad reading of the Code in 1992 by the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Lowe.158 There, the court held that the statute
included victims of nonviolent crime.159 It said the legislative purpose
was “to make all victims whole”160 and to avoid the need for victims to
pursue civil suits with “additional expense, stress and delay.”161
Id. at 5/5-5-6(a).
Id. at 5/5-5-6(b).
148
Id. at 5/5-5-6(d) (“A plea agreement . . . may require the defendant to make restitution
to victims of charges that have been dismissed . . . and under the agreement, the court may
impose a sentence of restitution on the charge or charges of which the defendant has been
convicted . . . .”).
149
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6(m) (2008).
150
Id. at 5/5-5-6(b).
151
Id. at 5/5-5-6(f).
152
Id. at 5/5-5-6(i).
153
Id.
154
Id. at 5/5-5-6(j).
155
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6(f).
156
People v. Fontana, 622 N.E.2d 893, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
157
Id. at 901–02 (quoting People v. Strebin, 568 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
158
606 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. 1992).
159
Id. at 1173.
160
Id. at 1171.
161
Id. at 1173.
146
147
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While some courts have construed the Code and the related crime
victim statutes liberally, crime victims often still go without remedy.
Advocates of constitutional crime victim restitution in Illinois had hoped
for more.162 They believed that explicit constitutional recognition of
crime victims restitution would prompt greater monetary remedies.163
Yet to date, the monetary remedies and their processes remain
inadequate. Restitution remains elusive, with, at best, standardless
discretion. Crime victims are often left to fruitless civil lawsuits after
criminal cases have ended. How have other states handled monetary
remedies for crime victims? Can their laws provide guidance for those
looking to enhance the constitutionally-recognized restitution right and
additional statutory provisions on crime victim recoveries?
V. SECURING BETTER MONETARY REMEDIES FOR ILLINOIS CRIME VICTIMS
Other states have strong and explicit constitutional and statutory
rights to monetary recoveries for crime victims.164 Unfortunately,
elsewhere as in Illinois there are many statutory and judicial failures to
implement and enforce crime victim recovery rights.165 Yet, a few
American laws do provide guidance on possible new laws, though no
single state has a comprehensive scheme. The approach elsewhere, as in
Illinois, typically embodies three separate avenues to crime victim
recovery:
restitution, victim compensation, and sentencing.
By
combining these avenues into a single scheme, and by borrowing select
provisions from other states, the Illinois General Assembly could
facilitate greater monetary recoveries for crime victims166 and meet the
expectations of 1992.
Illinimedia, supra note 40.
Id.
164
We particularly like the California provision that recognizes the constitutional right of
a crime victim, intended to “secure restitution” for “all persons who suffer losses as a result
of criminal activity,” requiring an order “in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a
loss,” where all monies “collected” from criminals ordered to pay restitution “shall be first
applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13).
165
See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy,
and Review, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 255, 342 (in commenting upon victims’ rights generally,
author concludes: “there is no way to proceed but to change victims’ illusory rights into
real rights . . . . To become real, rights must be accompanied by victim standing,
meaningful remedy, and review as a matter of right.”).
166
Federal initiatives on crime victim restitution during state criminal cases are unlikely.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). The Court notes:
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local . . . . The regulation and punishment of
intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been
162
163

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 3

88

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Monetary remedies for crime victims would be enhanced by a single
scheme organized by the stages in a criminal case. Thus, crime victim
recovery laws could speak to: (1) when a crime is being investigated; (2)
when a prosecutor is deciding to charge; (3) plea bargaining; (4) trial; (5)
sentencing; and (6) post conviction.
At the investigatory stage, legislators should better ensure that
victims become informed of their recovery rights.167 Law enforcement
officers should be trained on the content, and on the need to explain at
times, such rights.168 A victim advocate could be established, perhaps
locally within every county. Pro bono attorneys could be solicited to aid
certain crime victims.169
Upon the filing of a criminal charge, prosecutors, if not victims,
should be enabled at times to preserve170 or freeze171 more assets so as to
the province of the States . . . . Indeed, we can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent
crime and vindication of its victims.
Id. (citations omitted).
167
See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5.1 (2008) (requiring licensed hospitals to display
posters about the state-supported crime victim compensation fund and mandating that law
enforcement agencies inform victims of the compensation fund). See also KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 421.500(5)(d)(2)–(3) (West 2008) (noting that the Attorney for the Commonwealth is
to ensure a victim receives information on restitution and crime victim compensation); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-40, 42b, 43.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009) (mandating the Treasury
Department to establish Office of Victim-Witness Assistance, with information on
compensation and restitution, as well as to provide direct services to victims, including
food, shelter, clothing, medical, and psychiatric care).
168
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.172 (2006) (law enforcement officers trained in “victims
assistance and rights”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-102 (2007) (training of law enforcement
officers and prosecuting attorneys).
169
John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights
Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 695 (2002)
(“[T]hrough their inherent authority, courts can appoint attorneys to act as officers of the
court and represent crime victims on a pro bono basis.”). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4437 (2001 & Supp. 2008) (recognizing the right of the victim to have personal counsel,
including counsel presence at bench conferences relevant to victim’s rights); R.I. GEN LAWS
§ 12-28-9 (2002) (noting that within the state court system there is a victims’ services unit
responsible for assisting victims of crimes adjudicated in the superior and district courts,
including providing information and assistance on receiving restitution and
compensation); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-18-14.1(c)(2) (West 2008) (establishing that an
investigator appointed by the district attorney shall assist victims).
170
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.11(e)(1) (1999 & Supp. 2009) (acknowledging that for
certain criminal defendants “asset[s] . . . may be preserved . . . in order to pay restitution
and fines”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9728(e) (2007) (providing for the preservation of assets
“which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order”); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-38a-601(1)(a) (2008) (noting prosecutor may act “to preserve the availability of
property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order”); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-244(5) (2007) (establishing that the prosecutor may seek restraining order or
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facilitate later crime victim recovery. Of course, any ex parte orders
should be subject to quick review and all orders upon hearings should
meet minimum procedural due process safeguards.172
A victim’s monetary losses should also possibly be considered
during some decision-making on criminal prosecution. If the prosecutor
does decide to charge, the indictment or information could include
detailed information regarding the losses suffered by the victim. This
would aid later attempts at monetary recoveries. Of course, a victim
should not have much voice (and certainly no veto power) in decisions
on whether and what to charge (or continue to charge).173
During plea bargaining, repeated consultations by the prosecutor
with a crime victim help ensure possible monetary remedies will be
considered. In Mississippi, for example, by law a trial court may make
restitution a condition of accepting a plea.174 In Montana, the court must
impose restitution upon certain pleas of guilty.175 In Alabama, a court
will not accept a plea agreement unless the prosecutor recounts the
reasonable efforts made to confer with the victim.176 Connecticut
formerly permitted any victim to give an opinion before a court accepted

other judicial action necessary to preserve assets that could be used “to satisfy an
anticipated restitution order”).
171
E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29D-65 (2008) (asset freeze in matters involving
terrorism); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.532(1) (West 2009) (noting that the prosecutor can seek
an order directing a financial institution to “freeze” assets of an account holder charged
with a felony).
172
A cogent argument for expanding federal judicial authority to block criminal
defendants from transferring assets that could be used for later restitution is made in
statement of Professor Paul G. Cassell on improving restitution in federal criminal cases.
The U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, April 3, 2008 (source
available with author).
173
See, e.g., Briede v. Orleans Parish Dist. Attorney’s Office, 907 So. 2d 790, 792–93 (La. Ct.
App. 2005). The court noted:
The above cited laws give the district attorney broad discretionary
power in both instituting and handling criminal prosecutions . . . Mrs.
Briede’s allegations do not state a cause of action against either the
District Attorney of Orleans Parish, individually, or his office because
the decision to take any action to prosecute or not prosecute is within
the district attorney’s constitutionally granted powers.
Id.; State v. Sykes, 364 So. 2d 1293, 1297 (La. 1978) (entering of nolle prosequi rests entirely
within discretion of the prosecutor who possessed absolute discretion to dismiss
indictment). However, in Delaware, “[c]onsistent with the duty to represent the interests
of the public as a whole, the prosecutor shall confer with a victim before amending or
dismissing a charge. . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (2007).
174
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-26(2)(a)(i) (2007 & Supp. 2008) (“[r]easonable restitution”).
175
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(5) (2007) (“[S]entencing judge shall . . . require
payment of full restitution to the victim.”).
176
ALA. CODE § 15-23-71(1) (1995).
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a plea.177 In Michigan, the prosecutor is to confer with the victim before
finalizing the terms of a plea.178 In Delaware, “consistent with the duty
to represent the interests of the public as a whole, the prosecutor shall
confer with a victim before amending or dismissing a charge or agreeing
to a negotiated plea or pretrial diversion.”179 We support legal reforms
that require criminal prosecutors to consult with crime victims
specifically about potential monetary recoveries, as well as laws that
prompt trial judges entertaining plea arrangements to inquire about such
consultations.
Victims would also be aided in their pursuit of monetary remedies if
a criminal defendant was required, at times, to make certain financial
disclosures as components of guilty pleas.180
In California, in
anticipation of a restitution order, a criminal defendant must make a
financial disclosure.181 In Alaska, certain financial disclosures are now
required of defendants upon conviction.182 In Illinois only certain
victims183 of adjudicated crimes have statutory rights to depose the
convicted criminals (or others with “reasonable grounds to know”)
about the assets of criminals.184
At sentencing, after trial, a crime victim seeking recovery can
participate in varying ways. There could be a victim impact statement or
a required proof of loss claim. In Alaska, the prosecutor must inform a
crime victim of the right to make a victim impact statement showing
losses, the need for monetary relief, and recommendation as to the
sentence.185 In Colorado, a prosecutor must present a victim impact

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91(c) (repealed 1976).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.756(3) (West 2007).
179
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (2007).
180
See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13 (Vernon 2006) (mandating that
mediation services for victims and offenders be provided by volunteers trained by Texas
Department of Criminal Justice); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.4 (West 2008) (recognizing that a
victim-offender reconciliation program can lead to submissions to sentencing courts on
damages to victims under proposed restitution agreement). Delaware expressly allows for
creation of victim-offender mediation as an alternative to the criminal justice process. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9501 (2007). Minnesota invites restorative justice programs. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611A.775 (West 2009).
181
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f)(5) (Supp. 2009).
182
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045(j) (2008).
183
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 145/2.3 (2008) (cases involving persons “killed or physically
injured” in Illinois as a result of crimes “perpetrated or attempted against” those persons).
184
Id. at 145/3(a) (cases involving persons convicted, or found not guilty by reason of
insanity or guilty but mentally ill, “of first degree murder, a Class X felony, or aggravated
kidnapping”). See also id. at 145/3(b) (“[U]pon written request of the victim, The
Department of Corrections shall notify the victim of any assets of the person
convicted. . . .”).
185
ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.015(b) (2008).
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statement itemizing any economic loss, including losses after criminal
charges were filed.186 Where a conviction in a criminal case necessarily
entails a defendant’s responsibility for certain pecuniary harm, such a
determination should be deemed conclusive at sentencing (and
elsewhere via issue preclusion) when monetary remedies are pursued.187
After sentencing, new laws could ensure better recovery of monetary
remedies secured by court orders. Courts should be prompted to
monitor compliance. The Authors like the Georgia law, stating that
court clerks or probation or parole officers are statutorily mandated to
report regularly on the failures by offenders to pay restitution.188 Once
certain sentencing order violations become known, crime victims should
have statutory standing to seek relief189 so they need not rely on
prosecutorial discretion. We also especially like the new California
constitutional provision that not only recognizes a crime victim’s right to
restitution,190 but also requires a restitution order “in every case,
regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime
victim suffers a loss.”191 This California provision further states: “[a]ll
monetary payments, monies, and property collected from any person
who has been ordered to make restitution shall be first applied to pay the
amounts ordered as restitution to the victim.”192 Seemingly, this
somewhat limits government collections in forfeiture proceedings.193 In
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-102(1.5)(b) (West 2008).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-75 (1995) (“If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily
decides the issue of a defendant’s liability for pecuniary damages for a victim, that issue is
conclusively determined as to the defendant, if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.”).
Thus, there should be no defense of lack of mutuality as the crime victim would not be
bound, though the criminal defendant would be bound.
188
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-14(c) (West 2008).
189
For example, Indiana grants “standing” to victims to assert crime victim rights. IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-40-2-1 (West 2004).
190
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13). The victims are broadly defined, including “all
persons” who suffer related losses as a result of criminal activity leading to conviction. Id.
§ 28(b)(13)(A).
191
Id. § 28(b)(13)(B).
192
Id. § 28(b)(13)(C).
193
Forfeitures of crime-related property to government is governed, inter alia, in Illinois
by several statutes. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10A-15 (2008) (forfeitures relating to human
trafficking and involuntary servitude); id. at 5/11-20 (obscenity case forfeitures); id. at 5/1120.1A (juvenile prostitution and child pornography forfeitures); id. at 5/16-20 (forfeitures of
unlawful communication or access devices); id. at 5/29B-1(h) (money laundering
forfeitures); id. at 5/36-1 (forfeitures of vessels, vehicles, and aircrafts); id. at 5/37-2 (liens
upon public nuisances); id. at 5/37.5-5 (forfeitures relating to animal fighting); id. at 550/12
(forfeitures relating to cannabis); id. at 570/405.2 (streetgang criminal drug conspiracy
forfeitures); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT, 150/1 (2008) (drug asset forfeitures); id. at 175/1
(narcotics profits forfeitures). See generally Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996)
(analyzing federal constitutional guidelines on state forfeiture abatement actions involving
186
187
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Illinois, a statute only speaks expressly to “attachment against the
property” of the convicted criminal when the prosecution involved “first
degree murder, a Class X felony, or aggravated kidnapping.”194 Finally,
we support a new Illinois statute allowing crime victim awards to be
enforced at any time.195
VI. CONCLUSION
When Illinois voters added the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights to the
Illinois Constitution in 1992, they anticipated significant new benefits for
crime victims, including increased opportunities for restitution.
Although the amendment has spurred some new statutes, many crime
victims in Illinois still have little chance for restitution or other monetary
remedies during criminal cases. One could argue, perhaps, that the
restitution right should be self-executing, thus allowing direct civil
actions. For us, a better path to restitution, and to other monetary
remedies, for crime victims would be for the Illinois General Assembly
to establish a new comprehensive remedial scheme.
Integrated
approaches to monetary remedies for crime victims, speaking to the
varying stages of the criminal process, would help better secure the goal
of enhanced recoveries by crime victims established in 1992 by
overwhelming majorities of both legislators and voters. The 1992
initiative should finally prompt changes in the Victims and Witnesses
Act, the Compensation Act, and the Corrections Code so that more
Illinois crime victims receive more monetary relief during Illinois
criminal cases.

property employed during a crime); William James Haddad, Challenging Property Seizures
Under Illinois Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, 92 ILL. B.J. 365 (2004) (reviewing Illinois civil asset
forfeiture proceedings).
194
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 145/3(c) (2008).
195
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-108(a) (2008) (“Child support judgments . . . may be
enforced at any time.”).
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